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WHAT'S THE BID DEAL? CAN THE GRAND CENTRAL
BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT SERVE
A SPECIAL LIMITED PURPOSE?
DANIEL R. GARODNICKt
INTRODUCTION
Business Improvement Districts ("BIDs") have changed the land-
scape of urban governance. Clothed with limited powers traditionally
held by the state, BIDs are private entities that provide supplemental
sanitation, security, and social services to limited geographic areas
within cities.' Today, BID workers are a regular presence on the mu-
nicipal terrain-whether they are sweeping streets, hailing taxis, or
providing tourist information. BIDs have harnessed private sector
creativity to solve complex municipal problems and have made cities
safer and cleaner.2
Funded by an extra assessment on property owners, BIDs conduct
their operations with an efficiency that eludes city bureaucracies-
they are flexible, nimble, and directly accountable to the local
businesses that pay for the bulk of their operations. Yet, questions of
constitutionality exist when a BID, exercising limited governmental
powers, is managed by a board of directors elected through a process
that weighs votes in proportion to the value of land owned and
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' See GEORGE L. KELuNG & CATHERNE M. COLES, FIXDNG BROEEN WINDOWS:
RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNrMS 113 (1996) (providing
an overview of BID functions).
2 See Heather MacDonald, BIDs Really Work, CrIYJ., Spring 1996, at 29, 32 (explain-
ing that BIDs have made municipal areas safer and cleaner than they have been in
decades).
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guarantees that property owners will always comprise a majority of the
board.
Such questions were posed in a recent Second Circuit case, Kessler
v. Grand Central District Management Ass'n, in which non-property-
owning citizens residing in a BID challenged the voting structure for
electing members of its board.3 Disempowered from fully participat-
ing in the BID's management, the Kessler plaintiffs argued that a gov-
ernmental scheme that weighed the votes of property owners more
heavily than residents violated the constitutional guarantee of "one
person, one vote."4 As problematic as such a voting structure could
be, the success of BIDs and other special purpose districts arises from
their efficiency in providing services-efficiency that exists only at the
price of subjugating traditional notions of equality.
Nowhere have these questions been debated more fiercely than in
New York City, which is home to the largest concentration of BIDs in
the United States.5 Following an introduction to the BID concept in
Part I, Part II of this Comment discusses the nature of New York's
most prominent BID and the subject of the Kessler case: the Grand
Central Partnership ("GCP"). Part III addresses the Supreme Court's
treatment of the "one person, one vote" principle6 and its application
to local and special purpose districts. Part IV examines the Kessler
challenge itself, exposing flaws in both the District Court's and the
Second Circuit's analyses. Finally, this Comment will demonstrate
through hypothetical examples that BIDs actually may create ineffi-
ciencies because property owners and residents may not have match-
ing incentives for the provision of public goods.
3 158 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1998).
4 See Thomas J. Lueck, Apartment Owners Challenging Business District, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 1995, at BI (reporting the filing of the Kesslersuit on behalf of co-op owners
and apartment lessees). The one person, one vote principle was first articulated in
Reynolds v. Sims, 877 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (holding that legislative plans to apportion
seats in the Alabama legislature in a manner not based on population violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection).
See Thomas J. Lueck, Business Districts Grow at Price of Accountability, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 1994, at Al (explaining that BIDs' "greatest impact has been in New York,
where their numbers, size and financial clout dwarf those of BID's in other cities");
MacDonald, supra note 2, at 30 (noting that in 1996, New York City had 34 BIDs "with
up to 39 more in the wings").
6 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565 ("Full and effective participation by all citizens in
state government requires, therefore, that each citizen have an equally effective voice
in the election of members of his state legislature.").
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I. BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTs
A. What Is a BD?
BIDs are territorial subdivisions within a city in which all property
owners or businesses are subject to additional tax assessments that are
used to fund services and improvements within the district! Services
provided by BIDs are directed at improving the quality of life within
the BID's territory, and may include garbage collection, street main-
tenance, security patrols, and even limited social services.
Developed from the concept of "special purpose districts," BIDs
were created by state legislatures to remedy particular public policy
challenges that traditional governmental institutions either were inca-
pable of attacking or were simply unwilling to address. 10 While such
districts historically have been limited in scope, they have resolved
civic problems, such as water storage1 and agricultural improvements
and power,12 that affect certain individuals more than others. The
enabling statutes of the districts generally allowed them to operate on
a special, limited basis, while restricting the vote for the district's
13management to those who were disproportionately affected. Unlike
BIDs, special purpose districts typically did not address broad munici-
7 In New York City, BID assessments run at the rate of 15 to 23 cents per square
foot; real estate taxes in the city can reach eight to ten dollars per square foot. See New
York City BeneftisfromPrivate SectorParticipation, PUBLIc WORKS, Mar. 1, 1999, at 52.
8 See Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement Districts and
Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 368-69 (1999) (outlining the common fea-
tures of BIDs).
9 See id. at 369-70 (listing the typical services provided by BIDs); see also KELLING &
COLEs, supra note 1, at 113 (discussing the efforts made by BIDs to improve the qual-
ity of life within a city district).
10 See, e.g., Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719,
722 (1973) ("EF]or less costly projects which would benefit a more restricted geo-
graphic area, the State was frequently either unable or unwilling to pledge its credit or
its resources.").
" See i. at 726-33 (holding that limiting voting in elections for directors of a water
storage district exclusively to landowners represented an exception to the "one person,
one vote" rule because of its "special limited purpose" and "disproportionate ef-
fect... on landowners," and did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
12 See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 370-71 (1981) (holding that a plan to limit the
vote for directors of an agricultural improvement and power district to landowners
was, as in Salyer, constitutional under the exception to the "one person, one vote" prin-
ciple).
s See Ball, 451 U.S. at 370-71 (explaining that activities of the agricultural im-
provement district had a disproportionate effect on the class of people whom the sys-
tem made eligible to vote); Salyer, 410 U.S. at 723 (limiting the vote to 77 landowners
who would be disproportionately affected by the actions of the water storage district).
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pal problems nor provide police or social services.
BIDs have grown to serve an essential function in municipal gov-
ernance for several reasons. First, they successfully harness private
sector creativity for the purpose of beautifying and securing large
geographic areas in cities. 14 Second, they bring "government" one
step closer to the people, so much so that business leaders often call
their BIDs rather than their City Council officials for solutions to mu-
nicipal problems.5 Third, they appeal to many commercial mer-
chants because they solve the nagging "free rider" problem, 6 whereby
only some merchants foot the bill for local innovations, but all reap
the resulting benefit of the improvements. 7 BIDs also ensure that all
property owners in the area are locked into a payment scheme.1 Fi-
nally, limiting the vote to property owners ensures that revenues
raised will be reserved for the particular programs desired by those
most heavily burdened by the tax. 9
BIDs are structured so that all commercial, industrial, and resi-
dential property may be subject to a tax assessment in proportion to
the valuation of the property.20 A city agency collects the tax and dis-
14 See MacDonald, supra note 2, at 32 (noting how BIDs effectively brought "to pub-
lic spaces the techniques of 'common space management' that made malls and office
parks so successful").
15 See Interview with Andrew Manshel, former general counsel and assistant secre-
tary of the board of directors of the Grand Central Partnership, in New York, N.Y. (Jan.
5, 1999) [hereinafter Manshel Interview] (claiming that BIDs are more responsive to
local problems); see also MacDonald, supra note 2, at 41 ("The BID becomes a watch-
dog for service delivery because it is so close to the ground.").
16 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 107 (3d ed. 2000)
(explaining that whenever public benefits are paid for voluntarily, the possibility exists
that some will "free ride," or receive the benefits purchased by others without paying
for them).
17 See Briffault, supra note 8, at 369 (noting that the free rider problem "plagues
the efforts of chambers of commerce and merchants' associations to raise funds to pay
for services for their areas," because those payments are voluntary); see also MacDonald,
supra note 2, at 32. In the 1970s, Con Edison and other property owners around Un-
ion Square in New York City began to sweep streets and sidewalks, while the local mer-
chants' association attempted to garner financial support from other local businesses.
The resulting donations were "sporadic and paltry," so Con Edison gave up the effort,
.provoking an uproar from the same merchants who originally wouldn't pitch in." Id.
"' See MacDonald, supra note 2, at 32 (noting that once a BID is formed, contribu-
tions from local merchants are mandatory, collected by the city under its normal tax-
ing powers).
19 See Briffault, supra note 8, at 369 (explaining that BIDs ensure "that the revenues
generated by the supplemental taxes imposed on district businesses and property own-
ers are reserved for programs these taxpayers want, and are controlled by their repre-
sentatives").
2o SeeN.Y. GEN. MUN. LAws § 980-m(a) (McKinney 1999) (stating that "voting rep-
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burses the assessment to the BIDs.2' The BIDs use those funds to pro-
vide services that are supplemental to those provided by the city it-
self.2 Each BID has a "district management association" operated by a
board of directors that is entrusted with making strategic decisions
concerning the provision of daily services.!
In New York, the state legislature passed its BID law in response to
deteriorating conditions in business districts throughout many mu-
24nicipalities in the state. Like the special purpose districts noted
above, the predecessors to New York BIDs were established in the
1970s, when cities "created special districts which collected assess-
ments from property owners to pay for pedestrian malls and street
improvements. "2
B. Forming a BID
Several layers of approval are required before a BID is created.26
In New York City, for example, BID advocates must inform property
owners and commercial tenants of the proposed BID, including its
budget and tax assessment scheme, the services to be provided, and its
27territorial boundaries. Although no formal vote is required of prop-
erty owners, BID proponents must continue to solicit support "until
enough support has been generated and there seems to be general
consensus on the boundaries, services, and budget of the proposed
resentation of owners of property and tenants within the district" may be "weighted in
proportion to the assessment levied or to be levied against the properties within the
district").
21 See NEw YORK Cry COUNCaL iN. COMM., CrTES WrrHIN CrEs: BusINms
IMPRovEiMENT DismTRCrs AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE MICROPOIs 12 (1995) [herein-
after CrIES WITHIN CIrTES] (noting that "BID assessment bills are mailed annually by
[the Department of Finance] to property owners").
2 See Briffault, supra note 8, at 368 ("BIDs' services are provided in addition to
those offered by city governments.").
23 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAWS § 980-rn (requiring that a district management association
exist to carry out the activities prescribed in a district plan).
24 See Business Improvement District Act, 1989 N.Y. LAWS ch. 282, § 2 (listing
among the legislative findings the fact that "the business districts within many munici-
palities in the state are in a deteriorated condition"); see also Kessler v. Grand Cent.
Dist. Management Ass'n, 960 F. Supp. 760, 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), afd, 158 F.3d 92 (2d
Cir. 1998) (citing the legislative intent behind New York's BID legislation).
2' Crrrs WnHN CITIES, supra note 21, at 5.
26 The cumbersome approval process adds credibility to BID proponents' claim
that the duly-elected city government exercises control over BIDs from inception to
operation. For a discussion of BID autonomy, see infra Part II.A.
See CTms WITIN CrrEs, supra note 21, at 8 (describing the requirements of
BID formation).
20001 1737
1738 UNTVERSI7Y OFPENNSYLVANIA AWREVEW [Vol. 148:1733
BID."21 Supporters then must compile a detailed district plan29 and
forward it first to the Department of Business Services ("DBS"), which
is the City agency that oversees all BIDs, and then to the City Council
and other elected officials."0 Following an open public meeting, the
City Planning Commission reviews the proposal and prepares a report
approving or disapproving the district plan.s1 The Commission then
submits its report to the Mayor, Borough President, City Council,
relevant council member or members, and the City Clerk.
2
The City Council holds another public hearing and will receive
objections to the plan for a period of thirty days.33 This process ap-
plies only to property owners-lessees in the district subject to com-
mercial or residential leases do not have the right to file formal objec-
tions to the plan. Yet, if owners of at least fifty-one percent of the
assessed valuation of benefited real property within the BID, or fifty-
one percent of the owners of such property, file objections, the BID
will not be established.34 Unless sufficient objections block a BID's
creation, the City Council may vote to create the BID and to allow
DBS to contract with the BID for the proposed supplemental serv-
ices.35 The Department of Finance ("DOF") collects annual assess-
ments from property owners and provides the money to DBS, which
distributes bi-weekly disbursement checks to the BID.
36
At a time when "urban governments to a large extent dictate the
quality of life in urban America," 7 BIDs have been proliferating and
have been enormously successful in achieving real improvements!'
Id. (quoting NEW YORK CITY DEP'T OF Bus. SERVS., ESTABLISHING AND
OPERATING A BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE 4 (1984)).
See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 980-a (McKinney 1999) (setting forth the required
contents of the district plan).
'0 See CrTIEs WrrHIN CITIES, supra note 21, at 9-10 (describing the various city agen-
cies that must review the plan).
31 See id at 10 (describing the district plan registration process).
32 See id& at 10-11 (explaining the approval process).
See id. (noting property owners' ability to object to the plan).
34 See id. at 11 (describing the process whereby property owners may defeat a BID).
See id. (listing the factors the City Council will consider before approving a BID).
m See id. at 12 (describing the process by which assessments are collected and dis-
tributed).
37 Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Judicial Pursuit of Local Fiscal Equity,
92 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1662-63 (1979) (describing the immense impact of local fiscal
decisions on Americans' lifestyles).
See Briffault, supra note 8, at 370 ("BIDs are credited with playing an important
role in restoring urban morale and making older downtowns more attractive places to
shop, visit, do business, and seek entertainment.").
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Nearly forty BIDs are in operation in New York City, 9 and more than
half of the states have statutes allowing localities to create similar im-
provement districts.40 Approximately one thousand BIDs already are
in existence in the United States,41 and New York City's mayor,
Rudolph Giuliani, has said that BIDs are "filling in for government."
42
This phenomenon is perhaps most evident within the geographic area
of the Grand Central Partnership.
II. THE GRAND CENTRAL PARTNERSHIP
A. The Grand Central Partnership Defined
The Grand Central BID covers seventy-five blocks in midtown
Manhattan's central business area, with Grand Central Terminal
standing at its center.4 It encompasses a high-rent commercial area
with several architectural landmarks, including the Chrysler Building,
the Daily News Building, and St. Bartholomew's Church.44 It contains
s See CIrS WrrHIN CrTIES, supra note 21, at 7-8 (listing the BIDs in operation and
those pending approval in 1995); David Seifinan, Hizzoner Lashes Out at City's Big B1D-
Ness, N.Y. POST, May 3, 1998, at 20 (reporting that New York City has 39 BIDs). There
is a wide discrepancy in the tax base for these BIDs, however. While the Grand Central
Partnership has a $10 million annual budget, the White Plains Road BID in the Bronx
has a budget of $65,000, and the Church Avenue BID in Brooklyn has a budget of
$110,000. See Doug Lasdon & Sue Halpern, Wen Neighborhoods Are Privatized, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 30, 1995, atA29 (demonstrating the great variation in BID budgets).
4D Variations in the methods by which states authorize BIDs or BID-like organiza-
tions make obtaining an exact count difficult. One commentator identified 27 states
that authorize such organizations. See Mark S. Davies, Business Improvement Districts, 52
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 187, 187 n.2 (1997) (listing the states and their
authorizing statutes). Another identifies 40. SeeDavidJ. Kennedy, Note, Restraining the
Power of Business Improvement Districts: The Case of the Grand Central Partnership, 15 YALE
L. & POLY REV. 283, 290-91 n.61 (1996) (same); see also Briffault, supra note 8, at 368
n.7 (agreeing with Kennedy's count).
4 See Lawrence 0. Houstoun, Jr., Business Improvement Districts, ECON. DEv.
COMMENTARY, Spring 1996, at 4, 5 (explaining that there are between one and two
thousand BIDs in the United States and Canada). Some commentators have even ar-
gued for block-level improvement districts, with broader powers than existing BIDs.
See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DuKE LJ. 75, 97-
100 (1998) (suggesting a broad range of supplementary services this type of district
might provide). Similar proposals have been offered for purely residential neighbor-
hoods in New York City, such as the Upper East Side. See Lueck, supra note 5 (report-
ing on the battles surrounding the proposed creation of an Upper East Side security
force).
42 Lueck, supra note 4, at 1.
43 SeeKELuNG & COLES, supra note 1, at 113 (describing the geographic area of the
Grand Central Partnership).
44 See id.
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more than fifty-one million square feet of commercial real estate, ac-
counting for fourteen percent of Manhattan's total office space. 4 The
property within the GCP was valued at approximately $7.8 billion in
1994.46 The BID's security patrol has produced a sixty percent drop in
crime, taxi dispatchers maintain orderly queues outside Grand Cen-
tral Station, and new lampposts, planters, and trash receptacles sit on
nearly every block in the district 47 Dan Pisark, a director of the Grand
Central Partnership, noted that "new stores have opened, and existing
ones are investing in expansions, with vacancies as low as 2%. "48 Nei-
ther proponents nor critics can deny the positive impact of the GCP.
B. Function of the Grand Central Partnership
In its district plan, the GCP sought to contract with DBS to offer
the following supplemental services: security, sanitation, tourist in-
formation, social services for homeless persons, special maintenance
and repair, public events, and retail improvements. 49 Today, the GCP
has a security force of sixty-three officers, who are in close radio com-
munication with the New York City Police Department 0 Members of
the GCP security staff are "either licensed security guards or peace of-
ficers."51 While most are unarmed, some licensed supervisors do carry52
weapons. The GCP also has a thirty-eight person sanitation force to
"clean streets and sidewalks, wash street signs, paint fire hydrants, and
remove graffiti in the District." 3 It operates a tourist information
See MacDonald, supra note 2, at 33 (describing the GCP BID).
46 See id.
4 See iU at 29 (noting the significant change in the Grand Central area).
46 Lorna Pappas, Baiting the Hook, NAT'L REAL ESTATE INVESTOR, Sept. 30, 1999, at
58, 60.
4 See DISTRICT PLAN AS AMENDED FOR THE GRAND CENTRAL BUSINESS
IMPROVEMENT DIsTRIcT IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK BOROUGH OF MANHATTAN 9-12
(1994) [hereinafter DISTRICT PLAN] (describing proposed services to be provided by
the GCP). See generally Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Management Ass'n, 960 F. Supp.
760, 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), af'd, 158 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1998) ("The services provided by
[Grand Central District Management Association] are not meant to substitute for
those provided by the City, but rather are supplemental to those the City provides."
(citation omitted)).
"' See Kessler, 960 F. Supp. at 764 (describing the GCP security provisions). See also
Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Management Ass'n, 158 F.3d at 113 (Weinstein,J., dissent-
ing) (explaining that some officers may make warrantiess arrests and searches by virtue
of their peace officer status).
51 Kessler, 960 F. Supp. at 764.
52 See id. (noting that "[a] 11 members of the GCP security staff are unarmed, except
for licensed supervisors").
53 Id.
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booth in Grand Central Terminal and five tourist carts located
throughout the districtOs The GCP also runs an outreach, assessment,
and referral facility for the homeless that includes food service and
job training.5 It undertakes horticultural maintenance, plans public
events, and helps retailers improve their visual impact on the district
5 6
Despite the apparent breadth of the GOP's municipal powers, it
does not provide all of the services of a general city government
elected under a traditional voting structure. The GCP, for example,
"does.not operate any school systems, court systems, or administrative
tribunals, nor does it prosecute crimes, maintain jails, provide fire
services, license motor vehicles, license vendors, operate public librar-
ies, record deeds, have enforcement authority over consumer protec-
tion, environmental protection, traffic laws, or animal control.' 53
The GOP district is dominated by commercial entities, yet nearly
one thousand individuals own or lease residential property within its
boundaries. To such residents, the GOP serves an important role in
determining the provision of public services that affect them. It is for
these individuals that the GOP's voting structure presents the most se-
rious constitutional problems. The Kessler plaintiffs alleged that where
a local government provides general services that affect all citizens,
any limitation on the franchise is highly suspect5 9 The defendants in
that case responded that the GCP was limited in purpose, and that
traditional guarantees of voter equity should not apply in such special
districts.0 To set the stage for the Kessler action, the following section
explores the development of the one person, one vote principle and
its application to local governmental entities.
54 See id. at 765 (describing "tourist information services" operated by the GGP).
55 See id. (describing various social services provided for the homeless in the dis-
trict). The outreach program became a lightning rod for criticism in 1995 when the
GOP allegedly instructed outreach workers to beat homeless people to encourage
them to leave the district. See infra text accompanying notes 190-92 (describing allega-
tions that the GCP employed outreach workers as "goon squads" to beat the homeless
and the repercussions of those allegations).
56 See DISTRICT PLAN, supra note 49, at 9-12 (providing a detailed description of
services provided by the GCP).
17 See Kess/er, 960 F. Supp. at 764 n.2 (describing traditional functions of city gov-
ernments which the GCP does not perform).
'9 See id. at 770 (explaining that "as tenants, they are not represented on the Board
in proportion to their number," thus violating the principle of one person, one vote).
60 See i& at 766.
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III. LIMITATIONS ON FRANCHISE
A. The Establishment of the One Person,
One Vote Principle
The Supreme Court set forth the principle of "one person, one
vote" as a necessary condition of political equality in Reynolds v. Sims.
61
At issue in Reynolds was an Alabama legislative apportionment scheme
that divided districts without regard to population.62 The result was
that the vote of citizens residing in more highly populated districts was
worth less in relation to those in the less populated districts.6 Reject-
ing the State's historical, economic, and other group factor justifica-
tions, the Court concluded that every qualified resident had the right
to a ballot of equal weight for the election of state legislators.6 Chief
Justice Warren, writing for the majority, asserted an "inalienable right
to full and effective participation in the political processes. ' 5 He rec-
ognized that because the opportunity to exercise the franchise in a
free and unimpaired manner is necessary to preserve other basic civil
and political rights, any alleged infringement on the right to vote
61 377 U.S. 533, 565-67 (1964).
62 Id at 540 (challenging the apportionment scheme because it subjected some
voters to "serious discrimination with respect to the allocation of legislative representa-
tion").
6' See id. at 562 (explaining that if citizens in one part of the state were given two,
five, or ten times the weight of votes of citizens in another part of the state, the latter
citizens' votes would be effectively diluted).
64 See id. at 567 ("The fact that an individual lives here or there is not a legitimate
reason for overweighting or diluting the efficacy of his vote.").
Id. at 565; see also United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4
(1938) (recognizing the importance of safeguarding participation in the electoral pro-
cess by noting that "prejudice... tends seriously to curtail the operation of those po-
litical processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and ... call[s] for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry"); Yck Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
370 (1886) (referring to the political franchise of voting as a "fundamental political
right, because [it is) preservative of all rights"). Prior to Reynolds, the Supreme Court
already had concluded that the constitutionality of a state's apportionment of its legis-
lative seats presented ajusticiable controversy subject to adjudication by federal courts.
SeeWesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 4 (1964) (holding that attacks on the constitution-
ality of congressional districting plans are justiciable); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237
(1962) (recognizing a cause of action in the claim that votes in overpopulated state
legislative districts were underweighted, while votes in underpopulated districts were
overweighted). The Court also had already concluded that the Constitution prohib-
ited a state from using a county unit system for counting votes for statewide offices, and
thus diluting votes without regard for population. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368,
379 (1963) ("[A]l who participate in the election are to have an equal vote-whatever
their race, whatever their sex, whatever their occupation, whatever their income, and
wherever their home may be in that geographical unit.").
WHAT'S THE BID DEAL?
must be subjected to careful and meticulous scrutiny.6
The Reynolds Court reserved judgment on whether the one per-
son, one vote principle would be applicable to political subdivisions of
states, such as counties or cities. In dicta, Justice Warren noted that
local governments are "subordinate governmental instrumentalities
created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental
functions."67 At the time, those who opposed extending the one per-
son, one vote principle to cities and counties argued that because the
number and nature of their powers rested in the state's absolute dis-
cretion, they were not constrained by the same equal protection re-
quirements as the state itself.68 Yet, as states delegated more and more
powers to local entities, the Court became duly skeptical. This skepti-
cism culminated in the extension of the one person, one vote princi-
ple to local governments in 19 68 .0
B. Extension of One Person, One Vote
to Local Governments
The Court applied the Reynolds one person, one vote principle to
local governments in Avery v. Midland County.70 Avery was a taxpayer
and voter in Midland County, Texas, who alleged that the selection of
the local Commissioners Court from single-member districts of sub-
stantially unequal populations violated his right to Equal Protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment.7' Because the Commissioners
Court exercised "general governmental powers over the entire geo-
6 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562 (noting that the Court had previously referred to the
franchise of voting as a fundamental right (citing Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370)); see also
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) ("[W]hen [voting rights] are subjected to
'severe' restrictions, the regulation must be 'narrowly drawn to advance a state interest
of compelling importance.'" (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992))).
67 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 575.
See id. (finding that cities and counties are subordinate governmental instrumen-
talities created by the state to assist in carrying out state government functions, not
sovereign entities, and their powers rest in the absolute discretion of the state); see also
Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (holding that localities are ad-
ministrative arms of the state, not separate, autonomous governments).
69 See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1968) (holding that "the
Constitution permits no substantial variation from equal population in drawing dis-
tricts for units of local government").
70 Id.
7' See id. at 475-76 (outlining Avery's complaint and explaining that the "vast im-
balance" in district populations resulted from placing virtually the entire city of Mid-
land, the county's only urban center, in a single district).
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graphic area served by the body," Avery alleged that he was entitled
to a vote of equal weight to all other voters electing its members. The
respondents countered that because the functions performed by the
Commissioners Court were not legislative, but administrative, the
body was nothing more than an arm of the state of Texas. s The re-
spondents also contended that because the governmental body's ac-
tivities disproportionately affected rural dwellers, the principle of one
person, one vote should not apply.74
In finding for Avery, the Supreme Court considered the signifi-
cant policy and decision-making authority left to local governments in
the form of local home rule,75 immune from state legislative interfer-
ence. The Court concluded that there was little difference between
the "exercise of state power through legislatures and its exercise by
elected officials in cities, towns, and counties."76 The majority held
that "when the State delegates lawmaking power to local government
and provides for the election of local officials from districts specified
by statute, ordinance, or local charter, it must insure that those quali-
fied to vote have the right to an equally effective voice in the election
process.""7 The Court went on to explain that while the Commission-
ers Court made more decisions affecting rural dwellers, it had the
power to affect all citizens-rural and urban.78
Like the Reynolds Court before it, the Avery Court stopped short of
requiring that the one person, one vote principle be applied to all
72 Id. at 485. The Court stated that:
"[The Commissioners Court] is the general governing body of the county. It
establishes a courthouse and jail, appoints numerous minor officials such as
the county health officer, fills vacancies in the county offices, lets contracts in
the name of the county, builds roads and bridges, administers the county's
public welfare services, performs numerous duties in regard to elections, sets
the county tax rate, issues bonds, adopts the county budget, and serves as a
board of equalization for tax assessments."
Id. at 476 (quoting VERNON'S ANN. TEX. CONST. art 5, § 18 interpretive commentary
(1955)).
SeeAvery, 390 U.S. at 482.
74 See id. at 484 (recognizing the County's argument that the Commissioners Court
concentrated its attention on rural roads).
75 'Home rule" is defined as a state constitutional provision or type of legislative
action that results in apportioning power between state and local governments by pro-
viding local cities and towns with a measure of self-government. See BLACK'S LAW
DICIONARY 733 (6th ed. 1990).
76 Avery, 390 U.S. at 481.
77 Id. at 480.
78 See id. at 484 ("[T] he relevant fact is that the powers of the Commissioners Court
include the authority to make a substantial number of decisions that affect all citizens,
whether they reside inside or outside the city limits of Midland.")
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governmental elections. The Avery Court left open the question of
whether a "special-purpose unit of government assigned the perform-
ance of functions affecting definable groups of constituents more
than other constituents" might be immune from the one person, one
vote requirement.n In two forceful dissents, Justices Harlan and For-
tas emphasized the importance of allowing state legislatures to create
specialized governmental schemes that give weight to the votes of
those whom the government affects most2 0 Justice Harlan argued that
where the function of a government disproportionately affects a sub-
group, such as the rural dwellers in Avery, then extending the vote to
city residents actually denies the subgroup a proportional voice, un-
81dermining the "constitutional experiment" of Reynolds. Justice Fortas
criticized the majority's stringent application of one person, one vote
as "completely ignor[ing] the complexities of local govern-
ment.., which Reynolds itself states, demand latitude of prescrip-
tion. "'
C. StrikingDown Local Vote Restrictions
Continuing to federalize local election law,8 the Supreme Court
struck down a host of restrictive local voting schemes following Avery.
In Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, the Court considered the
constitutionality of a New York statute that limited the right to vote in
local school board elections to owners or renters of taxable property
within the school district and to parents of enrolled children.84 The
school board in question did not have general governmental func-
79 Id. at 483-84.
8o See id. at 492 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's decision "de-
prives localities of the desirable option" of varying the size of the constituencies of spe-
cialized units of government "so as rationally to favor those whom the government af-
fects most"); id. at 500 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (noting that the functions of many
specialized local bodies of government "have only slight impact on some of their con-
stituents and a vast and direct impact on others").
81 Id. at 491-94 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that under the majority's standard
"little or no allowance may be made for the greater stake of the rural inhabitants in the
county government").
82 Id. at 499 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
" See Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Govern-
ments, 60 U. CI. L. REV. 339, 340 (1993) (arguing that although there has been sig-
nificant federalization of local election law, such federalization "has been partial, [with
the states retaining] considerable control over the organization and structure of local
governments").
84 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969) (describing the content of section 2012 of the New
York Education Law).
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dons-its only responsibilities were school operation, prescription of
courses of study, and determination of the textbooks to be used.
Those permitted to vote under the existing scheme not only elected
the board but also approved the school's annual budget. 6 The plain-
tiff, who had no children and lived in an apartment with his parents,
sought to participate in the elections.8 7
The State justified the voting scheme by arguing that educational
policy was best left to those with "direct and definable" interests in the
polic-that is, parents of school children and the owners or lessees of
taxable property who were burdened with the cost of funding the
schools.88 Kramer argued that he was denied equal protection be-
cause he was foreclosed from participating in important policy deci-
sions-decisions which "he and others of his class are substantially in-
terested in and significantly affected by."89
The Kramer Court held that while the State was not required to
provide an elective school board, having done so, the legislature's
definition of the electorate was subject to strict scrutiny.9  The mere
existence of an election concerned the Court more than any specific
power or authority possessed by the school board.9' Striking down the
voting scheme, the Court explained that there was no compelling in-
terest in limiting the franchise in a manner that included those with
"a remote and indirect interest in school affairs" such as a renter of
taxable property with no children, while "exclud [ing] others who have
a distinct and direct interest in the school meeting decisions.
"
0
2
See id. at 623-24.
8 See id. at 624 (noting that the local voters "must approve the school budget sub-
mitted by the school board").
87 See id. at 625.
g See id. at 630-31.
89 Id. at 630.
0 See id. at 629 (noting that "'once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines
may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment'" (quoting Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665
(1966))).
9' See id. ("Our exacting examination is not necessitated by the subject of the elec-
tion; rather, it is required because some resident citizens are permitted to participate
and some are not.").
2 Id. at 632. The Court recognized that the statute also "disenfranchised senior
citizens and others living with children or relatives; clergy, military personnel, and oth-
ers who live on tax-exempt property; boarders and lodgers; parents who neither own
nor lease qualifying property and whose children are too young to attend school and
whose children attend private schools." Id. at 630. Kramer did not challenge restric-
tions on residence, age, or citizenship also present in the statute. See id. at 625 (noting
that the parties agreed that "the States have the power to impose reasonable citizen-
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That same year, in City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, the Court granted
certiorari to determine whether a state may restrict the franchise so
that only real property taxpayers may vote in elections to approve the
issuance of general obligation bonds.93 These bonds were to be issued
to finance "municipal improvements," such as "parks and play-
grounds, police and public safety buildings, and libraries."94 Property
taxes were to be levied to service the indebtedness, burdening the
property owners directly.9 The State justified this scheme by arguing
that decisions on bonds should be left to property owners because of
their pecuniary interest in supporting the bond issue.
9
6
The Kolodziejski Court looked to the municipal improvements that
would be financed by the bond issuance and found that the benefits
would accrue to property owners and non-owners alike.97 Because all
residents would be substantially affected by the outcome of the elec-
tion, the Court held that the Constitution would not permit the exclu-
sion of qualified, non-property-owning electors from the franchise. 8
The Court also noted that property owners would likely pass on the
burden to tenants "in the form of higher rent," and commercial prop-
erty owners would pass on the burden to the Phoenix residents in the
form of higher "prices for goods and services."9
Reaching a high water mark in striking down voting restrictions,
the Court invalidated a plan that granted a disproportionate vote to
electors of trustees for a junior college district in Hadley v. Junior Col-
lege District'° This district had far fewer governmental powers than
those possessed by the Avery Commissioners Court.101 This voting
ship, age, and residency requirements on the availability of the ballot").
93 399 U.S. 204, 205 (1969); cf. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 702 (1969)
(per curiam) (holding that a Louisiana law that gave the right to vote in elections to
approve the issuance of revenue bonds for a public utility only to property taxpayers
violated the Equal Protection Clause).
Kolodziejsk4 399 U.S. at 206.
See id. at 205-08.
% See id. at 208 (noting the State's argument that the law is justified because it rec-
ognized "the unique interests of real property owners").
97 See id. at 209 (explaining that all residents of Phoenix "have a substantial interest
in the public facilities and the services available in the city and will be substantially af-
fected by the ultimate outcome of the bond election").
98 See id.; see also infra Part IV.C.1 (discussing the provision of public goods).
99 Kolodziejsk4 399 U.S. at 211.
'*0 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
'0' The Hadley trustees had the power to "levy and collect taxes, issue bonds with
certain restrictions, hire and fire teachers, make contracts, collect fees, supervise and
discipline students, pass on petitions to annex school districts, acquire property by
condemnation, and in general manage the operations of the junior college." Id. at 53.
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scheme apportioned the junior college trustees on the basis of school
enumeration, yet gave the voters of a constituent school district with
sixty percent of the total school enumeration in the junior college dis-
trict only fifty percent of the representation on the board.0 3 While
the trustees' decisions primarily involved school functions, the Court
concluded that the powers were "general enough" and had "sufficient
impact throughout the district" to make the disproportionate voting
scheme impermissible.104 Finding that the college trustees were gov-
ernmental officials "in every relevant sense of that term,"05 the Court
held that their election had to comply with Reynolds's and Avery's one
person, one vote mandate.
0
1
D. The Special Limited Purpose Exception to the
One Person, One Vote Principle
The Court had often hinted that there could be an exception to
the Reynolds rule if the body to be elected served a special limited pur-107
pose. That exception was invoked first in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare
Lake Basin Water Storage Distri 1 80 and again in Ball v. James.'0° In these
cases, the Court held that when a government subdivision serves a
"special limited purpose," and has a disproportionate impact on de-
finable groups of constituents, it may be free from the equal protec-
tion constraints of the one person, one vote rule."0 In Salyer, plaintiff
The Court concluded that while these powers were not as broad as those of the Mid-
land County Commissioners in Avery, they represented "important governmental func-
dons." Id. at 53-54.
102 School enumeration is defined as "the number of persons between the ages of
six and 20 years [residing] in each district." Id. at 51 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.011
(Supp. 1967)).
103 See id,
'0' Id. at 54.
'0' Id. at 56.
"6 See id. at 54.
'07 See, e.g., id at 56 ("It is of course possible that there might be some case in
which a State elects certain functionaries whose dudes are so far removed from normal
governmental activities and so disproportionately affect different groups that a popular
election in compliance with Reynolds might not be required ..... "); Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474, 483-84 (1968) (explaining that a "special-purpose unit of gov-
ernment assigned the performance of functions affecting definable groups of constitu-
ents more than other constituents" might be exempted from the one person, one vote
rule); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964) (noting in dicta that the one person,
one vote requirement did not apply to cities or other political subdivisions of states
because they were merely "subordinate governmental instrumentalities").
103 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
109 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
"0 See Ball 451 U.S. at 370 ("[T]he functions of the [local government entity at
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landowners, landowner-lessees, and residents of the defendant's dis-
trict challenged the constitutionality of a California statute that lim-
ited the vote for the board of directors of the Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage District ("TLB") to landowners within the district.' The leg-
islative purpose of the TLB was to facilitate a local response to water
problems, including flood control and storage and distribution of wa-
ter to farms within the district" 2 The TLB served an exclusively agri-
cultural area with seventy-seven residents. The Court explained the
TLB's functions but distinguished them from general public services
as follows:
[T]o provide for the acquisition, storage, and distribution of water for
farming in the Tulare Lake Basin. It provides no other general public
services such as schools, housing, transportation, utilities, roads, or any-
thing else of the type ordinarily financed by a municipal body. There
are no towns, shops, hospitals, or other facilities designed to improve the
quality of life within the district boundaries, and it does not have a fire
department, police, buses or trains.11
In light of its narrow purpose, and pursuant to the exceptions
recognized in Reynolds, the Court exempted the TLB's authorizing
legislation from the strict scrutiny generally applied to franchise re-
strictions in favor of rational basis review." 4 It then concluded that
because restricting the vote to the disproportionately affected land-
owners wvas rationally related to a legitimate state interest, the law was
constitutional."5 The Court viewed the TLB as a harmless administra-
tive body, unlike the more liberally empowered government bodies at
issue in Avery and its progeny.16
In 1981, the Court broadened the scope of the "special limited
issue] are therefore of the narrow, special sort which justifies a departure from the
popular-election requirement of the Reynolds case."); Salyer, 410 U.S. at 728 (holding
that a local government unit was entitled to the exception made in Reynolds "by reason
of its special limited purpose and of the disproportionate effect of its activities on
landowners as a group").
.. See Salyer, 410 U.S. at 723-25 (describing the functions and governance of the
districts created under the California Water Code).
"' See id. at 723 (listing the statutory powers granted to the TLB regarding water-
related projects).
"" Id. at 728-29 (footnote and citations omitted).
. See id. at 728 (recognizing that the Reynolds exception applied to the TLB be-
cause of its limited authority).
"' See The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L. REV. 93, 184 (1981) (explaining
the two-step test applied by the Court in Salyer).
16 See Briffault, supra note 8, at 434-35 (analyzing how the Salyer water project ful-
filled the requirements of the Avery exception).
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purpose" exception in Ball v. James.'1 7 At issue was the Salt River Proj-
ect Agricultural Improvement and Power District ("SRP"), which, un-
like the TLB, affected metropolitan areas and included almost half of
Arizona's population."8 The SRP was authorized to store and deliver
water to owners of 236,000 acres of land in Arizona and to sell electric-
ity to thousands of people to subsidize its water operations. It also had
the power to assess property taxes, with the assessments serving as
liens on the property, and it could condemn land under the power of
eminent domain.119
Under the SRP scheme, the right to vote in directorial elections
was limited to landowners, and votes were apportioned according to
acreage owned. Plaintiffs were registered voters in the district who
owned either no land or less than an acre of land. They alleged that
because the SRP had the governmental authority to condemn land
and to sell tax-exempt bonds, and because it sold electricity to virtually
all district residents regardless of property ownership, election to its
120
board should be governed by the one person, one vote principle.
The Supreme Court held that the SRP had a narrow function that
did not trigger the strict scrutiny of Reynolds, noting that "[t]he Dis-
trict cannot impose ad valorem property taxes or sales taxes. It cannot
enact any laws governing the conduct of citizens, nor does it adminis-
ter such normal functions of government as the maintenance of
streets, the operation of schools, or sanitation, health, or welfare serv-
ices."1 21 The Court concluded that, like the private administration of
water resources,ln the provision of electricity is not a traditional ele-
ment of governmental sovereignty.123 Therefore, the electorate of
such a special purpose unit of government "may be apportioned to
give greater influence to the constituent groups found to be most af-
117 451 U.S. 355, 361 (1981). For a discussion of the extent to which Ball v. James
broke from the principles of Reynolds, see William H. Riker, Democracy and Representa-
tion: A Reconciliation of Ball v. James and Reynolds v. Sims, 1 Sup. cr. ECON. REV. 39,
39-41 (1982).
18 See Bal4 451 U.S. at 365 (comparing the structures of the TLB and the SRP and
concluding that the SRP was wider in scope).
"9 See id. at 357.
"20 See id. at 360 (discussing the basis of plaintiffs' constitutional claims).
121 Id. at 366.
' See Salyer, 410 U.S. at 723, 729 (listing the water-related services provided by the
TLB and finding that those activities did not constitute a traditional governmental
function).
' See Ball 451 U.S. at 368 (discussing why the provision of specific utilities should
not trigger the Reynolds doctrine).
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fected by the governmental unit's functions." 2
1. Summarizing Salyer and Ball
For purposes of the Reyno/ds analysis, Salyer and Ball set forth two
criteria for distinguishing proprietary enterprise from democratic lo-
cal governments: (1) disproportionate impact on landowners, and
(2) a special limited purpose.'2 While this appears to be a simple test,
in practice it has produced confusing results, forcing courts to engage
in elaborate factual inquiries of impact and purpose. Some have
found the Court's justification for the exception to be unpersuasive,
charging that "the Court does not have a consistent theory for why lo-
cal electoral systems should follow particular paradigms."128 Professor
Briffault has argued that the first criterion is "circular" and the second
can be arbitrary. 7 He has explained this argument by drawing a dis-
tinction between "proprietary" and "democratic" visions of construing
impact. A "proprietary model" assesses impact by considering only
those who bear the economic burden of the local government's ac-
tion, while under the "democratic model," all persons benefited by
the performance of services are considered to be affected.28
[W]hether a district's actions have a disproportionate impact on a land-
owner constituency will turn on whether disproportionate impact is
viewed through a proprietary or a democratic lens; yet the presence or
absence of a disproportionate impact on landowners is supposed to de-
termine whether the proprietary or democratic framework is applied.
The analysis is entirely circular.
Even for districts that provide just one or a handful of services and
that have a landowner or taxpayer constituency, Ball and Salyer provide
no theory for distinguishing general governmental functions from spe-
cial limited purposes.
Because governmental activities "cannot easily be classified in... neat
categories,"3 the application of Salyer and Ball has presented many
problems. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the "science
24 Town ofLockport v. Citizens for CommunityAction at the Local Level, Inc., 430
U.S. 259, 266 (1977) (citing Salyer, 410 U.S. at 719).
2 See Ball 451 U.S. at 364 (utilizing the two-prongedSalyeranalysis).
116 Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeownes Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519,
1543 (1982).
1 Briffault, supra note 83, at 370.
'2' See id. at 370-71 (explaining the proprietary and democratic models).
'2v Id. at 371, 373.
""' Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 482 (1968).
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of government... has but few fixed principles, and practically consists
in little more than the exercise of a sound discretion, applied to the
exigencies of the state as they arise."' 1 With few fixed principles, gov-
ernment is often forced to experiment-as it did in creating special
districts-to address such exigencies. While special districts likely will
continue to play a role in local governance, the Salyer and Ball prece-
dents have created a confusing doctrine that is reflected in the incon-
sistent way lower courts have evaluated these cases.
2. Treatment of the SalyerException
by Lower Courts
The lack of guidance by the Supreme Court in evaluating special
districts has forced lower courts to engage in a fact-specific inquiry
into whether "governmental" powers exist and whether they have a
disproportionate impact on the group afforded the voting right. Prior
to Kessler, three circuit court cases were handed down that illustrate
how courts afford varying weight to considerations of purpose and
impact.
In one such case, the Second Circuit held that a voting scheme to
elect a school board with the power to propose budgets and to bor-
row, but not to tax, did not fall under the "special limited purpose"
exception to the Reynolds rule.' 2 At issue in Baker v. Regional High
SchoolDistrict No. 5 was a scheme for electing school board members in
Connecticut from towns of substantially differing populations. 3 The
school district had the power to initiate and to propose expenditures
for the district, but it did not have the broad taxation power of the
junior college district in Hadley.TM Like the Hadley Court, the Second
Circuit concluded that the district carried out governmental functions
and that the one person, one vote principle should apply.3 5 Distin-
guishing this case from the "limited purpose" districts in Salyer, the
court noted that the school district's general power impacted all vot-
,' Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 226 (1821).
112 See Baker v. Regional High Sch. Dist. No. 5, 520 F.2d 799, 802-03 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 995 (1975).
"3 See id. at 800 (noting that while there was a large disparity in town sizes, as well
as in the number of students from each town and in each town's fiscal contribution to
the district, the three towns had equal representation).
114 See id. at 801.
'-" See id. at 801-02 (holding that the regulatory and supervisory powers were suffi-
ciently broad to constitute governmental activity).
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136
ers.
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit struck down a restrictive voting
scheme that applied to a state agency that had regulatory power, but
no power to tax, spend, or propose budgets.8 7 In Hellebust v. Brown-
back, the court held that the one person, one vote rule would apply to
elections for a state's board of agriculture principally because of the
"breadth of oversight exercised" by the board.1 u In that case, the
board, which was elected by delegates from various agricultural or-
ganizations, had regulatory powers that affected all Kansas residents.
These powers included inspecting milk and meat, regulating pesti-
cides, and removing water from rivers and aquifers throughout the
state.1 Because the board functions "materially affect[ed] residents
of Kansas who [were] not represented," the Tenth Circuit struck down
the voting scheme as a violation of equal protection.40
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit upheld a restrictive voting scheme
for a school board, emphasizing the board's inability to levy taxes."'
In Pittman v. Chicago Board of Education, Chicago public school princi-
pals challenged state laws that created local school councils and lim-
ited the eight representatives on such councils to six parents and two
residents of the district' The principals themselves sought to be
considered as candidates. Despite obvious similarities to the junior
college district in Hadley, the court upheld the district, relying on the
important factual distinction that the Chicago school districts lacked
the power to tax.143
IV. THE KESSLER CHALLENGE
The controversy surrounding BIDs and the confusing doctrine
created by Salyer and Ball suggest that the Supreme Court soon might
' See id. at 802 (explaining that while the water districts' actions disproportion-
ately affected the landowners in Salyer, the schools district's powers affected everyone
in this instance, and also noting that Salyer specifically mentioned schools as a general
public service).
'"7 SeeHellebustv. Brownback, 42 F.3d 1331, 1332 (10th Cir. 1994).
"' Id.
139 See id. at 1333 (listing the powers of the board).
40 Id. at 1334.
. See Pittman v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 64 F.3d 1098, 1100, 1105 (7th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1243 (1996).
112 Seeid. at 1100.
1' See id. at 1102 (explaining that while the power to tax is not dispositive, it is con-
textually important in light of the fact that the council was not the overall governing
board).
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be called upon to address whether "business improvement" is a special
limited purpose as contemplated by its precedents. The Second Cir-
cuit recently upheld a restrictive voting scheme in Kessler v. Grand Cen-
tral District Management Assn, a case that involved a challenge to a law
guaranteeing majority representation on the governing board to
property owners within the BID.144  The disputed scheme divided
board representatives into four classes-A, B, C, and D.14 The GCP
Bylaws provided that Class A Directors, elected by Class A members
(owners of real property), would constitute a majority of the Board at
all times.4 6 Within Class A, property owners had their votes weighted
in proportion to the assessed valuation of their land, and the number
of Class B and C Directors was to be established by the Board "from
time to time." 47 Class D directors were four individuals, each ap-
pointed by a specific City official.
48
At the time of the trial, there was only one Class C representative
serving on the board to represent the 930 people who lived in co-ops
or rental apartments within the district. In contrast, the area's 242
property owners had thirty-one representatives.' 49 Plaintiffs were ten-
ant-shareholders of 372 Fifth Avenue Owners, Inc., a cooperative
apartment building on 35th Street that fell within the territory of the
GCP150 Because the cooperative held fee title to the building where
the plaintiffs' apartments were located, the tenant-shareholders did
not qualify as "owners of record of real property" as required for Class
A membership. They were, instead, limited to Class C membership,
reserved for occupants pursuant to leases of dwelling units.'5' Class C
144 158 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1998).
'4 The classes were divided as follows: Class A. Owners of real property in the
BID's district; Class B: Tenants who are occupants pursuant to leases of commercial
spaces; Class C: Occupants pursuant to leases of dwelling units; Class D: Persons serv-
ing as directors by virtue of their appointment by the Mayor, City Comptroller, Man-
hattan Borough President, and Majority Leader of the City Council. Each member
class elected the director class of the same designation. SeeBYLAWS OF GRAND CENTRAL
DISTRICT MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, INC. art. I, § 1 [hereinafter BYLAWs] (identifying
the classification of all corporation members). In the district court proceeding, the
court found that Class A voters had 31 representatives on the Board, Class B had 16,
Class C had one, and Class D had four. See Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Management
Ass'n, 960 F. Supp. 760, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affld, 158 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1998).
"' See BYLAws, supra note 145, art. II, § 1.
147 Id. art. I, § 1 (establishing the parameters for each director class).
4 See id. (noting who may appoint Class D directors for service).
"9 See Kessler, 960 F. Supp. at 766.
0 See id. at 763 (introducing the plaintiff class and the nature of its relationship to
the GCP).
151 See BYLAWS, supra note 145, art. I, § 1.
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directors were unable to constitute a majority of the board under New
152York law and the GCP Bylaws. The plaintiffs charged that the voting
system "'privilege [d] one class of district members over another with-
out regard to actual number or place of residence,"' and that these
limitations on their right to vote for a general-purpose governmental
body should be subject to the one person, one vote principle and
equal protection analyses.1 3 The GCP maintained that: "(a) it does
not exercise general governmental powers, (b) it does not supplant or
replace local government, (c) its activities are subject to the supervi-
sion and control of the city, and (d) its activities affect property own-
ers disproportionately."'-
Relying on the exceptions carved out by Salyer and Ball, both the
district court and the Second Circuit found the restrictive voting
scheme to be permissible because the activities of the GCP dispropor-
tionately affected the property owners and served the limited purpose
of promoting business in the area. 5 According to the district court,
the one person, one vote rule is applied only when a governmental
body exercises "'general governmental powers' and 'perform[s] im-
portant governmental functions,' that ha[ve] significant effect on all
citizens residing in the district."
1
1
Comparing the powers of the junior college trustees in Hadley
5 7
and the water storage and agricultural improvement districts in
Sa 
159
Salyer5 and Ball" to the functions of the GCP, the district court con-
1512 See Kessler, 960 F. Supp. at 766.
153 Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Management Ass'n, 158 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 1998).
The plaintiffs' complaint continued: "Because residents are consigned to a permanent
minority status on the Board even though they are numerically superior to the class of
owners of property within the district, they are deprived of any meaningful opportunity
to advance their interests concerning [GOP] activities." Id.
114 Id. (listing all of defendants' defenses intended to trigger the Salyer exception).
"-1 See i& at 104, 108; Kessler, 960 F. Supp. at 774-75.
16 Kessler, 960 F. Supp. at 771 (quoting Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 363 (1981)
(quoting Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 53-54 (1970))). This is a factual
determination; only if the functions have a significant effect on all citizens does the
one person, one vote principle apply. See id. (concluding that the Reynolds rule was
applied in Hadley because the junior college district was not viewed as a limited pur-
pose governmental body (citing Hadley, 397 U.S. at 53-54)).
157 See Hadley, 397 U.S. at 53 (listing the trustees' functions as levying and collecting
taxes, issuing bonds, hiring and firing teachers, making contracts, collecting fees, su-
pervising and disciplining students, passing on petitions to annex school districts, ac-
quiring property by condemnation, and managing the operations of the junior col-
lege); see also supra text accompanying notes 100-05 (discussing the sufficient general
powers finding of the Hadley court).
" See Salyer, 410 U.S. at 728-29 (listing the TLB's functions as the acquisition, stor-
age, and distribution of water for farming in the Tulare Lake Basin); see also supra text
2000] 1755
1756 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIALAWREVEW [Vol. 148:1733
cluded that the GCP served a limited purpose because its services were
subject to significant oversight by the City.16 The Second Circuit af-
firmed the district court's decision, holding that the purpose was lim-
ited because the GCP's services were: (1) supplemental and secon-
dary to City services; (2) "quantitatively dwarfed by those of the City";
and (3) "qualitatively different from core municipal functions.
1 61
There are flaws, however, in the factual and legal determinations
relied upon in each court's adjudication of this case. For example,
there is less oversight of New York City BIDs than the district court
surmised. And, while it is true that the GCP's activities are "dwarfed"
by the services provided by the City, its functions are far from limited
or unique. Rather, the GCP performs services nearly identical to core
municipal functions. Finally, while the services provided may be sup-
plemental to those that the City provides, it is not clear that they affect
business owners disproportionately. They may, in fact, create highly
undesirable results for GCP residents.
A. Limited Authority/Significant Oversight
The first inquiry for courts evaluating BIDs is whether the chal-
lenged entity is autonomous from the state or city government. If
there is no autonomy, then it is part of the government itself, and vot-
ers are presumptively protected by the oversight of the duly-elected
city or state officials. The issue of oversight is a double-edged sword
for BID advocates. On one hand, to serve a "limited purpose," BIDs
are forced to argue that they are directly accountable both to their
constituencies and to public officials.162 On the other, BIDs are suc-
cessful because of their inherent flexibility and their ability to sidestep
the city bureaucracy to accomplish their goals.
accompanying notes 111-16 (discussing the special limited purpose exception to the
one person, one vote rule articulated in Salyer).
159 See Ball, 451 U.S. at 369 (listing the district's functions as the storage and distri-
bution of water, the creation and sale of electrical power, and the hiring of employees,
making of contracts, and the acquisition of property to effectuate its water-related du-
ties); see also supra text accompanying notes 117-23 (discussing the extension of the
Salyerexception in Ball).
10 See Kessler, 960 F. Supp. at 773 (citing the various mechanisms the city govern-
ment may utilize to control the GCP's behavior and noting that the city remained ac-
countable to BID residents).
'61 Kessler, 158 F.d at 105.
112 SeeThe Grand Central Partnership Response to the StaffReport to the Commit-
tee on Finance 5 (Nov. 12, 1997) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review)
("Grand Central Partnership 'has limited authority over the services it provides.'"
(quoting Kessler, 960 F. Supp. at 773)).
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The Kessler courts upheld the GCP voting scheme based on their
conclusion that the GCP had very limited authority and that it was
subject to a "high level of municipal control."16s To support these
findings, the courts cited two means of accountability: (1) the fact
that the GCP "must obtain approval of its plan from the City govern-
ment before it can act '  and (2) the existence of four voting Class D
board members who are appointed by elected officials and who repre-
sent the interests of the City.1
The claim that the City exercises significant authority over BIDs is
both supported and contradicted by the Giuliani Administration's re-
cent efforts to exercise greater control over the GCP, and by the
GCP's inaction in response. In 1998, Mayor Giuliani became increas-
ingly concerned with the growing power of Daniel Biederman, the
president of the GCP and of two other contiguous midtown BIDS,1
who was widely known as the "mayor of Midtown." 67 Mayor Giuliani
charged that Biederman's BIDs were "acting like governments unto
themselves" and were turning into private "fiefdoms."16s In April 1998,
the Commissioner of Business Services issued a new directive requir-
ing BIDs to notify the Department of Business Services ("DBS") of all
activities, new initiatives, budget changes and contacts with other City
agencies." In what appeared to be either a conflict over the GOP's
unwillingness to provide information to the City and its failure to
1 Kessler, 960 F. Supp. at 773. The court explained that oversight of the BID is
significant:
[l]t means that City officials retain accountability to their constituents within
the BD. BID residents unhappy with BID activities can always turn to their
elected representatives, who, under the statutory scheme, have not abdicated
their responsibilities to the BID Board. This safety net is even more apparent
when one considers that four Board members are appointed by and represent
the interests of City officials.
d.
'63 See id. (citing the voting power of the Class D directors as a control mechanism
on the GCP's authority).
66 Daniel Biederman was the president of the Grand Central Partnership, the Bry-
ant Park Restoration Corporation, and the 34th Street Partnership. See Thomas J.
Lueck, Business Improvement District at Grand Central Is Dissolved, N.Y. TIMS, July 30,
1998, at Bi.
167 See Bidding Biedennan Farewell, N.Y. POST, Sept. 24, 1998, at 36 (noting that
members of the press had anointed him the "mayor of Midtown").
16s Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
16 See Philip Lentz, Giuliani Directive Puts the Handcuffs on BIDS: Gives Department of
Business Services Right To Approve Districts' Activities, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., Apr. 6, 1998, at 4
("[M]any BID managers interpreted the new rules as giving City Hall the right to block
BID plans before they get off the ground.").
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comply with certain City rules and regulations171 or simply "personal
pique," the Mayor refused to renew the GCP's contract to manage the
BID in July 1998.171 The City stated that it would not agree to a new
contract until Biederman resigned as president of two of the three
BIDs.
172
While the City's unilateral contract cancellation was legally ques-
tionable,1 it is telling that the GCP did not respond with a legal chal-
lenge against Mayor Giuliani. The GCP's hands were tied. If it ar-
gued that the City did not have the right to cancel the contract, it
would have conceded that BIDs were in fact the autonomous "fief-
doms" that the mayor complained of. Yet accepting the City's author-
ity to do so would be inconsistent with the autonomy and flexibility
that the GCP considers to be the hallmarks of its operations.
The balance of the evidence suggests that the GCP was far more
independent than the district court concluded. Even Andrew Man-
shel, the former General Counsel of the GCP, acknowledged:
We have traditionally had that flexibility which the city government has
not had. So, if [the GCP sanitation force] under-runs its budget by
$75,000 and someone has another nice project they want to do.... those
decisions haven't even risen to the Board level. The president has made
[them], usually in consultation with the chairman. In city government,
you cannot do that.
1 74
Similarly, in a pair of sharply critical reports, the New York City Coun-
cil Finance Committee found that BIDs were unaccountable in two
'70 See Lueck, supra note 166, at B1 (exploring the DBS's reasoning for refusing to
renew the GCP's contract, including general "noncompliance" and "noncoopera-
tion"). The City and the GCP engaged in months of negotiations, which were followed
by the City's announcement that it would not approve the customary five-year exten-
sion of the GCP's contract, but instead would only renew it for one month. See id. at
B2.
1 John Podhoretz, An Ill-Advised Assault on an Urban Visionary, N.Y. POST, Aug. 14,
1998, at 27 (arguing that there was no legitimate reason for Mayor Giuliani to cancel
the GCP's contract).
172 See id. (noting that the rule that a single individual cannot run multiple BIDs
undercuts the notion that BIDs are privately run and can independently decide who
manages them).
7 See, e.g., Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Management Ass'n, 158 F.3d 92, 111, 116
(2d Cir. 1998) (Weinstein, J., dissenting) (explaining that the City may not legally
withhold assessments it collects on the GCP's behalf and that the City may not dissolve
the GCP so long as there exists outstanding debt from GCP-issued bonds). Some
raised the possibility that the GCP could challenge the City in court, arguing that it was
being denied a "right to operate a public-spirited nonprofit organization." Lueck, su-
pra note 166, atB2.
174 Manshel Interview, supra note 15.
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important respects.1 75 First, once established, BIDs have the potential
to exist in perpetuity. Assuming it has no outstanding debt, a BID can
be dissolved only by a City Council resolution or upon written petition
of owners of at least fifty-one percent of the assessed valuation of
benefited real property, and fifty-one percent of the owners of such
property.' 76 BIDs cannot be dissolved if they retain an outstanding
debt, such as bonds or long term loans.77 Second, the City makes lit-
ie effort to monitor whether benefited property owners wish to con-
tinue supporting a BID. 78 In one of its reports, the City Council
charged that DBS is "negligent in its oversight responsibility by failing
to monitor and address property owner concerns regarding the over-
all management and governance of the BID."' 79 DBS may decline to
renew a BID contract, but with the exception of Giuliani's action in
1998, "contract renewal is based on perfunctory hearings and submis-
sions, which do not adequately measure property owner satisfac-
tion."180
The City has even less control over the GCP's budgeting proce-
dure. The GCP does not need the City Council's approval for its
budget if the budget is less than or equal to that of previous years.'
The City also may not legally withhold any of the assessments it col-
lects on the GCP's behalf.'82 The GCP has issued $32 million in
bonds, which are charged against the City's state constitutional debt
limit and for which the City may well be liable in the event of a de-
fault 18
'75 See CrnrEs WrHN CITms, supra note 21 (providing a broad analysis of the func-
tion and structure of municipal BIDs); FINANCE COMMrEE, THE COUNCIL OF THE
CIY OF NEW YORK, MANAGING THE MICROPOLIS 7-39 (1997) [hereinafter MANAGING
THE MICROPOLIS] (discussing various BID-related concerns in four New York City BID
case studies).
17 See CIr=S WrmIN CITIES, supra note 21, at 18 (arguing that the private dissolu-
tion option is preventively expensive).
'7 See id. (noting a BID's ability to issue bonds and accumulate accounts payable).
'7" See id. at 19 ("DBS makes little effort during [a BID's] contract renewal period
to determine if there is continued support for the BID.").
179 MANAGING THE MICROPOLIS, supra note 175, at 32.
"" CrrEs WiTHIN Crrms, supra note 21, at 19. As of 1995, DBS had regularly re-
newed every expired BID contract. Seeid. at 17-18.
See Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Management Ass'n, 158 F.3d 92, 111 (2d Cir.
1998) (Weinstein,J., dissenting).
18 See id
'83 See id. at 111-12.
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B. General Governmental Powers
If an entity is determined to have significant autonomy, equal pro-
tection analysis requires that a court determine whether it either ex-
ercises general governmental powers, or serves a special limited pur-
pose as contemplated by Salyer. In Kessler, the Second Circuit
concluded that efforts to provide social services and to improve the
physical appearance of the district alone did not transform the GCP
into a general governmental body. T8 The court reasoned that the
GCP has a limited purpose because the region is devoted overwhelm-
ingly to commercial use and its goal is to assist property owners to
"achieve the remunerative use of that commercial space."' The Sec-
ond Circuit explained that BIDs can still serve a limited purpose even
though municipal problems "are necessarily more complex"8 6 than
the agricultural concerns at issue in Salyer.
Salyer did, however, distinguish the functions of a water storage
district from traditional governmental functions, 7 such as housing,
transportation, utilities, or roads, and those affecting "quality of
life.""'8 The GCP's activities relate to most of these governmental
functions. It provides limited housing for the homeless, sets up acces-
sories for the City transportation system (such as bus signs and taxi-
stands), and maintains Grand Central Terminal itself."9 It also keeps
the sidewalks clean and orderly. Through its supplemental police
force, additional sanitation, flower pots, and public events, the GCP's
activities are similarly geared to affect the quality of life.
In fact, the GCP's provision of two traditional governmental serv-
ices-security and homeless outreach programs-has faced substantial
public criticism in recent years. In 1995, the New York Times re-
ported that "outreach workers," organized by the GCP to offer refer-
rals for food, shelter, and counseling, were allegedly being sent out as
self-described "goon squads" to roust the homeless, to beat them, and
to physically force them out of district bank vestibules and plazas and
off of sidewalks. 9 Fervently denied by the GCP,'9' the incidents
'84 See id. at 104.
185 Id.
18 Id.
117 See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 728-
29 (1973).
'88 Id. at 729 (noting that the lack of quality of life functions in that case supported
the view that the district had limited authority).
18. See Kesslr, 158 F.d at 105 (describing the GCP's functions).
'9 See Bruce Lambert, 'Goon Squads' Prey on the Homless, Advocates Say, N.Y. TIMES,
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prompted the Department of Housing and Urban Development to
discontinue a half-million dollar grant to the GCP for homeless pro-
grams.192 The debacle served as a cautionary reminder of the dangers
of semi-private entities exercising powers traditionally entrusted to the
state.
Even the stated purpose of the BID-improvement of busi-
193ness -is an amorphous goal lacking identifiable limits. Every mu-
nicipal service affects business in some sense because it affects the wel-
fare of the community. In fact, "the [GCP] is not 'limited' by statute
or contract to those activities which directly promote business.1 94
Critics have argued:
If you can say that [GCP's activities] are business purposes .... then the
City of New York is a business improvement district... and the United
States is a business improvement district. Our entire foreign policy is for
business purposes. For all the things for the last 20 years that looked in-
consistent, like us supporting dictators in Indonesia, and us supporting
apartheid, then saying we have trouble with communism because of hu-
man rights violations, the one unifying factor is business purposes..... .. 195
[I]t's all a business improvement district.
Apr. 14, 1995, at BI (reporting allegations that GCP workers "roughed up homeless
people").
191 Jeffrey Grunberg, the executive director of the Grand Central Partfiership So-
cial Services Corporation at the time of the incident said: "It's not true-it's fiction.
None of it happened." Id. In an interview in his offices on January 5, 1999, Andrew
Manshel, the Partnership's General Counsel at the time of the incident, noted that
there were "no hospital records .... no police reports of anyone having been in-
jured .... [and] insufficient evidence [for the Manhattan District Attorney] to bring
indictments." Manshel Interview, supra note 15; see also MacDonald, supra note 2, at 37
(disputing the veracity of the New York Times report, calling it a "brilliant public rela-
tions coup").
192 See Department of Housing and Urban Development, News Release: HUD Assis-
tant Secretary Andrew Cuomo Cancels Federal Funds to Grand Central Partnership After Investi-
gation Finds Evidence of Brutality Against Homeless People; July 5, 1995 (reporting the deci-
sion of HUD to terminate GCP's federal grant). The "goon squad" incident also
formed the basis for a lawsuit against the GOP for violations of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act by providing sub-minimum wages to the outreach workers. In Archie v. Grand
Central Partnership, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 504, 507-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), a federal district
court held that the Partnership unlawfully paid "goon squad" workers sub-minimum
wages to perform clerical, administrative, maintenance, food service, and outreach
work. Despite the GCP's contention that the "workers" were participants in a job-
training program, and were thus not entitled to minimum wage, the court found for
the plaintiffs in the action. See id.
113 See Kessler, 158 F.3d at 94 (stating that BIDs are "intended to promote business
activity").
'94 Id. at 126 (Weinstein,J., dissenting).
193 Interview with Douglas Lasdon, Executive Director of the Urban Justice Center,
in New York, N.Y. (Jan. 5, 1999). Mr. Lasdon was one of the plaintiffs' attorneys of re-
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The breadth of "business improvement" suggests that the lines drawn
by the Kessler courts may be inconsistent with the Avery and Hadley de-
cisions, where the Court held that the principle of one person, one
vote must apply.19 The governmental functions performed by the
GCP appear to be at least as broad as the Commissioners Court in
Avery and the junior college district in Hadley, both of which failed the
"special limited purpose" prong of Salyer.1 97
C. Disproportionate Impact
The Kessler courts' analysis of the disproportionate impact of the
GCP's voting scheme is also worthy of greater scrutiny. This prong of
the equal protection inquiry focuses on whether the challenged voting
classification is supported by a "genuine difference in the relevant in-
terests" of those enfranchised and those denied an equal political
voice. 98 In its Kessler opinion, the Second Circuit stressed that Salyer
does not require that the selected class of voters for limited purpose
entities be the only parties affected.'" The court held that the proper
inquiry is whether the effect of the operations on property owners was
"'disproportionately greater than the effect on those seeking the
vote."
20 0
Under the GCP voting scheme, there are two relevant effects.
20Viewed through a proprietary lens, °' the first is the burden of the as-
sessment to support the BID, which clearly falls disproportionately on
property owners. While non-property owners may be burdened indi-
rectly through leases that reflect the cost of the assessment,2 2 "there is
cord in both the Kesslerand Archie challenges.
"6 For a detailed discussion of the governmental functions at issue in Avey and
Hadley, see supra text accompanying notes 69-82, and 100-06. But see Ball v. James, 451
U.S. 355, 370 (1981) ("Nothing in the Avery, Hadley, or Salyer cases suggests that the
volume of business or the breadth of economic effect of a venture undertaken by a
government entity as an incident of its narrow... function can. . . subject the entity to
the one-person, one-vote requirements of the Reynolds case.").
197 See Ball, 451 U.S. at 370 ("[A]n aspect of that limited purpose is the dispropor-
tionate relationship the Districts' functions bear to the specific class of [voters].").
"8 Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action at the Local Level, Inc., 430 U.S.
259, 268 (1977) (setting forth the second branch of equal protection analysis in similar
voting schemes).
"9 See Kessler, 158 F.3d at 108.
Id. (quoting Bai, 451 U.S. at 371).
201 See Briffault, supra note 83, at 371 (explaining the "proprietary model's method
of assessing impact").
202 See Kessler, 158 F.3d at 107 ("[S] ome property owners who lease their property to
others may seek to pass all or part of the cost of the assessment to their tenants ... by
raising rents.").
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no way that the economic burdens of district operations can fall on
residents qua residents."2 13 Viewed through a democratic lens, 2 4 the
second effect is the impact of BID services on those who reside within
the BID's territories. It is far less clear that this effect falls dispropor-
tionately on the property holders.
BIDs may impact non-property-owning residents by having signifi-
cant influence on city governance as a whole. The property owners
within the GCP who own some of Manhattan's most valuable property
are, by definition, among the most wealthy people in New York. They
provide a significant portion of the City's tax base, and, because of
their prominence, they have greater access to elected officials and sig-
nificant opportunity to influence them. These property owners have
an incentive to lobby the City to decrease the general City tax because
they do not want to pay for City services twice.05 According to Robert
Solomon, who represented the plaintiffs in Kessler, "if the city cur-
rently has a revenue pie of 100 pennies.., and the BIDs self-tax, rais-
ing the pie to 110 pennies, they get to keep all those additional pen-
nies and will pressure the city against the tax increase.
" 2
16
Economist Moshe Adler cites the City's actions during the 1992-
1993 fiscal crisis as an example of BIDs' influence on larger City pol-
icy.207 During the crisis, the City fired hundreds of sanitation workers
and reduced the number of machine-driven street cleaning days from
six to four.00 Adler charges that as a result of the proliferation of
BIDs, "no pressure [was] coming from the city's most influential citi-
zens, and the former street-cleaning schedule was never restored. "2 °9
Such self-interested pressure from powerful groups could have a dev-
astating impact on poorer sections of the City. As explained below,
2
10
this pressure actually might create damaging results for non-property-
owning residents within the GCP's territory.
23 Id. (quoting Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S.
719, 729 (1973)).
2 See Briffault, supra note 83, at 371 (noting that this view utilizes "an expansive
definition of economic impact").
20 Commercial tenants in another New York City BID, the Madison Avenue BID,
recently wrote to the mayor to ask why they should have to "contribute toward services
that the city is already responsible for providing and for which they were already pay-
ing taxes." Moshe Adler, Why BID's Are Bad Business, N.Y. TMES, Feb. 13, 2000, § 14, at
17.
2 MacDonald, supra note 2, at 41.
SeeAdler, supra note 205.
2' See id.
0 id.
2'o See discussion infra Part II.G.2.
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BIDs also affect non-property-owning residents by operating in di-
rect competition with the City on a broader scale. Under New York
law, in any given year, a municipality only can raise a limited amount
of its revenues from taxes on real property 1  BIDs levy an assessment
on all property owners within their districts, which is included in the
total amount the City of New York is permitted by law to raise.212 The
inevitable result is that the City has a lower limit when raising discre-
tionary taxes, thereby decreasing its ability to provide other City serv-
ices.
In that vein, BIDs also have the statutory authority to float bonds
to pay for their more substantial improvements. Pursuant to state and
City law, the GCP has issued bonds totaling approximately $32 million
dollars. Interest payable on these bonds is tax exempt.2
13 By authoriz-
ing BIDs to issue bonds, the City faces additional competition in the
bond market among those seeking to support local bond issues. 14 No-
tably, the GCP has earned a higher rating on its bonds than has the
215City of New York in recent years. Since its bonds have received a
lower rating, the City is forced to offer a higher rate of interest in the
bond market than the GCP. Thus, the GCP bonds present a lower-risk
alternative than do New York City bonds, particularly for those inves-
tors wishing to support local bond issues while pursuing a more risk-
averse portfolio.
1. Providing Public Goods to City Residents
The broader effect of BIDs on non-property-owning residents can
best be demonstrated by an analysis of the distribution of public
goods. A municipality's primary function is "to provide local public
goods,"216 which have two defining qualities. First, they are nonrival-
rous, meaning that the consumption of a public good by one personS 217
does not leave less for anyone else. Second, they are nonexcludable,
211 See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 3-b (McKinney 1999) (setting forth the limits on the
amount to be raised by tax on real estate in any fiscal year).
212 See id
2's See Kessler, 158 F.3d at 111 (Weinstein, J., dissenting) (noting GCP's bond issu-
ance and its characteristics).
214 See id. at 111-12 (stating that the issuance of GCP bonds reduce "the amount of
money that the City can raise through its own future bond issues").
2- See MacDonald, supra note 2, at 34 (noting that in 1992 and 1993 the GCP's
bonds received a credit rating of Al, "far higher than the city's").
16 Ellickson, supra note 41, at 88.
217 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 16, at 42 (defining the nonrivalrous consump-
tion quality of public goods).
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which means that no private profit-maximizing enterprise would sup-
ply them because the cost of excluding nonpaying beneficiaries is too
218high. Public goods include commodities like those offered by
BIDs-sanitation services, police protection, and limited aesthetic im-
provements.
As an example, Cooter and Ulen discuss a city block that is
plagued by crime, prompting some residents to propose hiring a pri-
219vate guard. Many residents contribute to this venture voluntarily,
while others refuse. This creates a danger that paying residents would
"instruct the guard not to aid nonpayers in the event of a mugging."22°
Even so, the very presence of a private guard would make the street
safer for everyone, because "muggers are unlikely to know who has
and who has not paid for the guard's services."22' Thus, there is no ef-
fective way for payers to compel nonpayers to contribute, and the
nonpayers enjoy a free ride.
It appears from the example above that the Kessler plaintiffs are
free riders-they pay disproportionately low assessments, but ostensi-
bly reap a high marginal benefit. One might suspect that the resi-
dents and business owners have matching incentives to improve the
quality of life in the district. The improvements made in the Grand
Central area arguably are those that residents should expect from an
optimally-performing government. Accordingly, if there were no dif-
ference in priorities between the residents and businesses, then it
would have been irrational for the GCP to have expended time and
resources to fight the lawsuit. A brief illustration, however, suggests
that such matching incentives may not exist2
2. Negative Net Benefit
Consider a hypothetical situation in which the 920 residents and
businesses within the GCP might have dissimilar interests. Assume
218 See id. at 107 (defining the nonexcludability quality of public goods).
219 See i
Sid.
221 a
22 See id.
It should also be noted that there may be some divergence in interest between
the owners of real property and tenants pursuant to leases of commercial space within
the GCP. A prime example occurred upon the formation of another New York BID,
the Downtown Alliance BID. The city created the BID, then announced a plan to
change zoning to allow offices in the district to be converted into apartments. See Ad-
ler, supra note 205. The conversions benefited landlords, but to commercial tenants,
the zoning changes were "a calamity." Id.
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that the businesses, which have formed a partnership, are interested
in a strong police presence for their clients and customers only during
business hours. Also assume for the purposes of this discussion that
residents of the area want high police levels especially in the evening
hours, upon returning home after businesses have closed for the
day.2 4 In the absence of a BID, the City of New York may provide a
constant level of police protection (whose value equals ten units) dur-
ing the entire twenty-four hour period (five in the day, five at night).
This serves the interest of the businesses who want their clientele to
feel safe during the day, as well as the interest of residents, who spend
more time in the area in the evening hours. A properly functioning
general city government would seek to respond to the needs of both
the business and residential communities.
Then, introduce a BID. A BID such as the Grand Central Partner-
ship, in which property owners have a controlling interest, may decide
to provide increased police services itself during the Monday to Friday
business hours (with an additional value of three units), but not at
night. This preference is commensurate with the interests of the
property owners, since they are the ones who rent space to the busi-
nesses in the region. The result is that during the daytime hours,
there are now eight units of police protection (five units from the City
and an additional three from the BID). Since the BID chooses not to
add units at night, the police protection from the City remains con-
stant at five.
Let us estimate that each resident pays $100 per year for the ad-
ministration of the BID,2 and that the value to the resident of the
additional three units of police protection is only $50, since the resi-
dent spends little time in the BID area during daytime hours. Since
the marginal benefit to the resident of gaining the three police offi-
cers during the day ($50) is less than the levied cost ($100), the resi-
dent will be worse off for having contributed to the BID administra-
tion. There is both a positive benefit ($50), and a positive cost ($100),
24 The specific circumstances of this hypothetical situation would not exist in the
territory of the GCP because the police provided by the BID do not have the same co-
ercive powers as those of the New York City Police Department. Yet, it serves to illus-
trate a situation in which there are not matching incentives. It could play itself out in
decisions whether to incur greater debt, long-term structural improvements, and the
area of many government services, including sanitation or social welfare programs.
225 In reality, residents do not pay any additional taxes directly to the GCP. See
Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Management Ass'n, 158 F.3d 92, 107 (2d Cir. 1998). The
Second Circuit recognized, however, that it was possible that "part of the cost of an as-
sessment would be passed on to resident nonlandowners." Id.
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but the positive cost outweighs the positive benefit in this case. If,
however, the BID chooses to increase police at night (an unlikely
event considering the composition of the Board and the likely prefer-
ences of commercial property owners), the benefit to the residents
would outweigh the costs. Similarly, if the residents are not forced to
provide any funds directly or indirectly to the BID, they will be better
off because more public goods (i.e., three extra units of daytime po-
lice) are better than fewer, all other things being equal.
3. Government Changes Its Basic Services
As explained above, there is a danger to BID residents that gov-
ernment will change its services in response to BID lobbying, or that it
will decrease its services voluntarily, free riding on the BID's provision
of services. In both situations, the Kessler plaintiffs might be affected
simply because they have little representative voice.
BIDs are an exercise in collective action.26  Once BIDs are
formed, they are hard to disband, and the BID rationally will use its
influence to achieve maximum benefits for the narrow interest of the
represented members. As a practical matter, a BID contract comes up
once every five yearsH7 and only can be dissolved if it retains no deb 2 s
Because BIDs conceivably could exist in perpetuity, the use of a BID's
collective voice to lobby the city government creates a real danger to
the minority (in this case, residents).
Assume, as above, that ex ante the City allocates ten units of law
enforcement daily-five during the day and five at night. The BID ra-
tionally might use its influence, for example, to ask the City to change
its policy and reallocate seven of those units during the day, leaving
only three at night. Again, the BID might decide independently to
pay for three more daytime units of police, bringing the total to ten
units during the day. Since the BID has less incentive to provide po-
lice at night, it likely will not allocate resources to night protection,
even though the City's allocation has dropped to only three nighttime
units. This will result in a "public bad" for residents. In the absence
226 See MANCUR OlsoN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GRouPs 9-16 (1971) (describing the connections among lobbying, col-
lective action, and governmental responsibility).
See Kessler, 158 F.3d at 95 (stating that contracts are "subject to renewal for a five-
year term at the 'sole discretion' of the City" (citation omitted)).
22 See Kessler, 158 F3d at 116 (Weinstein,J., dissenting) ("The City does not possess
the power to dissolve the [GCP] or a successor because the [GCP] has issued bonds
and remains financially obligated to satisfy its outstanding debt.").
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of the BID, the residents had an even distribution of five units during
the day and five at night. Now, in the aggregate, they have thirteen,
but their preferences are not reflected-they have only three at night,
whereas they had five prior to the lobbying effort by the BID. Even if
they do not contribute to the BID revenues, they are worse off. They
do not have the safety provided in the hours they want, and even the
duly elected city government neglects their wishes as a result of the
BID's successful lobbying efforts.
If, in the alternative, the government simply reduces its allocation
of funds to the area because of the BID's existence, it becomes a free
rider on the BID's services.2 This is particularly problematic for the
residents, whose preferences are not reflected by a board structurally
favoring property owners. In this scenario, the BID is dictating the
governance of the area, while the one entity protected by the demo-
cratic, one person, one vote principle, the city, abdicates all control.
A fundamental problem exists with the structural majority repre-
sentation of property holders on the Board of Directors of the GOP.
All residents must pay an assessment, albeit small, without the ability
to exercise a majority vote on the Board. In his Avery dissent, Justice
Fortas argued that votes should be doled out, as in the corporate
shareholder context, in proportion to the number of shares pos-
sessed.2 ° The problem with this analogy is that all corporate share-
holders have the same incentive-to maximize profits-whereas the
incentives in the BID context seem to vary significantly. As group
preferences concerning the allocation of resources within a BID di-
verge, the minority status of contributing members may lead to unjust
results. Residents may be forced to contribute to an arrangement
which, in the end, leaves them worse off.
CONCLUSION
BIDs can provide an extremely effective and attractive alternative
to traditional government. Supporters assert that if all BIDs were to
cease operations tomorrow, "it is fanciful to think that New York
would revamp its work rules, civil service policies, and spending priori-
ties fast or fully enough to prevent further business decline. Forcing
2 See, e.g., MacDonald, supra note 2, at 42 ("We are all free riders on BID expendi-
tures.").
See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 507 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting)
(comparing the electoral plan for the Midland County Commissioners Court to the
standard of corporate decency).
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businesses to die a slow death in order to highlight the City's failings is
unlikely to refocus its priorities."2 ' If we concern ourselves with indi-
vidual rights, such as equality principles in voting, "the city goes bank-
rpt .... You have to do what needs to be done to see that the city
survives. " 2
BIDs should be preserved because of their success in solving com-
plex municipal problems. Pointing out the constitutional flaws with
the Kessler decision, and the rationality of the plaintiffs in bringing the
suit, is not intended to minimize the value of BID-provided services.
Yet recognizing the positive results of BIDs does not change the fact
that the operations of the Grand Central Partnership are not limited
in the factual sense anticipated by the Supreme Court in Salyer and
BalL
Salyer and Ball create an exception to the strict scrutiny ordinarily
applied to any restrictions on the right to vote. The exception is nar-
row-even by definition-applying only where a district serves a "spe-
cial limited purpose" with a disproportionate effect on those afforded
the right to vote. The Supreme Court has given limited guidance to
lower courts in their efforts to construe this doctrine, and has forced
them to conduct factual inquiries analogizing challenged districts, for
example, to the water storage and electrical districts in Salyer and Ball,
the junior college districts in Hadley, and the Commissioners Court in
Avery. Amidst this confusion, those courts have produced inconsistent
results.
The Second Circuit evaluated the Kessler challenge in this context.
The court considered the GCP and saw a semi-private entity that lev-
ied an assessment on a small group of property holders to provide lim-
ited services that affected those individuals disproportionately. The
City creates the BIDs, collects their assessments, and redistributes
them to the management association-all of which suggest a fair
amount of municipal control. The services they provide are arguably
de minimis, in the form of street-sweepers, flower pot holders, and
uniform street signs.
The power of BIDs, however, is not limited to the simple services
they provide. The GCP board is comprised of powerful and influen-
tial people, and its success largely is due to its ability to provide sanita-
tion and security services, and make capital improvements quickly, ef-
ficiently, and without municipal interference. The BIDs' ability to
' MacDonald, supra note 2, at 41.2 Id. at40.
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lobby and influence broader City policies is not quantifiable, but it is
worth considering. The potential to have such an impact (albeit
mostly positive) on City residents both within and without the BID
raises the specter of whether "business improvement" was contem-
plated by the Supreme Court when it set forth the "limited purpose"
exceptions in Salyer and Ball Until the Supreme Court examines this
question, however, lower courts are left with little precedential guid-
ance in determining whether a BID's governmental purposes and dis-
proportionate effects trigger the constitutional requirement of "one
person, one vote."
